Shimla Agreement Insights

For pre-and-postiches: has the Simla agreement – origin, impact and results been successful? See ICJ`s approach to territorial disputes (Libya/Chad) ICJ Reports 1994, p. 6; Where there is no international agreement, the closest basis is data. This principle has been used to define post-colonial borders in Latin America, Asia and Africa; See P.M Munya, « The International Court of Justice and Peaceful Settlement of African Disputes: Problems, Challenges and Prospects, » 7 J. Int`l. Prac. (1989), 159, 215; See the conflict of land, island and maritime borders (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening), 1986 ICJ to 570; Minquiers and Ecrehos 1953 ICJ 65-90 It was this inherent tension in these two strategic objectives that conditioned India`s overall attitude on the eve of the Shimla Summit. It is interesting to note that India has had some earlier insights into Pakistan`s approach to the summit after the meeting of Soviet leaders with Pakistani negotiator Aziz Ahmed. On 27 June, Moscow wired Delhi that, although Ahmed stressed that Pakistan wants to insist firmly on the old ceasefire line, « it seems to us that the Pakistani side had a reserve position on cashmere… Ahmed made it clear that Bhutto was in principle ready to explore the possibility of transforming the ceasefire line into a permanent international border. In the end, during the Shimla final, Gandhi evolved as a swing factor between the postures of strength and accommodating. The alternative of calling Bhutto`s bluff and leaving without agreement, Gandhi and Haksar were deemed too expensive after India`s dramatic triumph in 1971. The self-limitation that underpinned India`s attitude was all too noticeable to the Pakistanis.

Ahmed, their negotiator, later noted that « India`s excessive fear of avoiding the failure of the talks at all costs has become its great handicap, » while it held « all the negotiating tokens. » Haksar later noted that « force negotiations » are part of the diplomatic currency. But negotiating with someone weak is even more difficult. « We have to accept that the United States does not have much influence or control over this process, » Lalwani said. « We can make proposals, insights and try to get discussions through, but it`s in the hands of indians and Pakistanis and Kashmiris, as long as the Kashmiris have a say. » Recalling their agreement of 23 September 1998, an environment of peace and security is in the supreme national interest of both sides and that the resolution of all outstanding issues, including Jammu and Kachmir, is essential to this end. The Lahore Declaration is a remarkable treaty under the 1988 NNAA Treaty and the 1972 Shimla Treaty. [6] Following the signing of the agreement by the two prime ministers, Pakistan`s Foreign Ministers, Shamshad Ahmad and India`s K. Raghunath, signed a joint action on 21 February 1999 to promote an environment of peace and security between the two countries. [6] The agreement confirmed the ongoing commitment of their respective governments to the principles and objectives of the UN Charter. [6] The international and regional context after 1971 had made the realization of some kind of agreement an important political objective for Gandhi and his national security team. After a successful war that liberated Bangladesh, politicians tried to continue to submit India`s status by showing a credible attempt at peace.